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Emerging pathogen evolution
Using evolutionary theory to understand the fate of novel infectious pathogens
Camille Bonneaud* & Ben Longdon
W hat needs to happen for apathogen to successfully infect anew host species? This is a critical
question given the devastation that emerging
pathogens can cause. For instance, several
major pandemics have occurred in the last
century that have killed millions of people,
including the pandemics of 1918 H1N1 influ-
enza, which partly originated in birds, and of
HIV, which originated in chimpanzees. The
21st century has already had its share of
outbreaks of zoonotic origin—SARS, MERS,
Ebola, Hendra and Nipah—and the current
COVID-19 pandemic has become a major
international public health, social, economic
and political crisis. Steady advances in biol-
ogy and medicine mean that we are now
better at identifying pathogens of epidemic
potential and at monitoring the spread of
novel infections worldwide than ever before
(e.g. https://nextstrain.org/). Nevertheless,
designing effective public health strategies to
contain infectious outbreaks, particularly
given other potentially conflicting interests
(e.g. economic), remains incredibly complex.
Here, we provide a brief overview of our
current understanding of how and why patho-
gens evolve in novel host species, to guide an
understanding of the potential evolutionary
consequences of our control measures.
Jumping into a novel host
A successful jump into a novel host species is a
three-step process. First, the pathogen must
come into contact with the novel host. Next, it
must successfully infect the novel host, which
may involve binding to host cell receptors,
entering cells and hijacking the cellular machin-
ery to replicate, and/or escaping host defences.
Finally, there must be sufficient onwards trans-
mission of the pathogen for its persistence and
spread through the novel host species.
......................................................
“Steady advances in biology
and medicine mean that we
are now better at identifying
pathogens of epidemic poten-
tial and at monitoring the
spread of novel infections. . .”
......................................................
The steps of infection and transmission can
represent such formidable challenges for the
pathogen that, in most cases, it fails to estab-
lish in the novel host species. A pathogen may
rely on the host’s cellular machinery for
survival and replication, and to persist, it
needs to avoid the host’s immune defences.
Even in an environment to which the pathogen
is well adapted, this can be a feat, but it is
likely to be even more so in a novel host
where the cellular machinery and defences are
unknown. The relative similarity of these
conditions in closely related species may
explain why pathogens are more likely to
successfully shift to a new host species closely
related to original donor host. For example,
more zoonotic human pathogens have origi-
nated from non-human mammals than from
other vertebrate taxa and several major human
viruses, such as hepatitis B virus, HIV and
yellow fever virus, were originally acquired
from primates (Parrish et al, 2008). The novel
host may also present unexpected difficulties
for transmission if differences in behaviour
and/or the social structure affect contact rates
between individuals. To overcome all these
challenges, the emerging pathogen will need
to acquire critical mutations that maximise its
success in a novel host species.
While some emerging pathogens may have
“off-the-shelf” or pre-existing adaptations that
allow them to infect and transmit in a
different host species, others rely on the abil-
ity to rapidly evolve such adaptations after
jumping into a novel host (Pepin et al, 2010)
(Fig 1). The extent to which the critical muta-
tions necessary for sustained transmission in
a novel host need to have pre-existed or can
arise de novo remains, however, unknown.
Regardless, following a jump into a novel
species that then becomes the predominant
host—in contrast to occasional spillovers—a
pathogen will typically undergo evolutionary
changes that, if anything, should fine-tune its
adaptation to the novel environment.
......................................................
“The steps of infection and
transmission can represent
such formidable challenges for
the pathogen that, in most
cases, it fails to establish in the
novel host species.”
......................................................
Such adaptive changes occur through
mutations that improve the process of infec-
tion or increase transmission. These can
include mutations that strengthen the binding
affinity to the novel host cells or tissues,
enable the pathogen to avoid, manipulate or
suppress the host immune system, and/or
give rise to more effective transmission, such
as by increasing persistence in the external
environment. For example, influenza viruses
naturally infect birds through a faecal–oral
route. Yet a change in their sialic acid-binding
preference can allow them to bind and enter
human epithelial cells of the upper respiratory
track. Gain-of-function experiments with
avian H5N1 influenza A, which infects but
does not efficiently transmit among humans,
showed that only a handful of mutations
would be sufficient to increase transmissibility
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via respiratory droplets in a mammalian host.
The number and position of the mutations
required to improve infection and transmis-
sion in the novel host will affect the likelihood
and speed of pathogen adaptation following a
host shift, with critical implications for
pathogen persistence and virulence.
Virulence at disease outbreak
Virulence is stringently defined as the
disease-induced mortality rate of infected
hosts. More virulent infections cause greater
harm and/or death. There is obviously a
large variation in the amount of harm that
different pathogens will cause, ranging from
typically benign (common cold) to highly
lethal (Ebola). But there is also variation in
the amount of harm caused by different vari-
ants of the same pathogen. Furthermore, the
host’s response also shapes the overall level
of virulence of an infection. A healthy person
with a working immune system should suffer
less from an infection than someone with
compromised immunity, such as HIV-infected
patients or those undergoing chemotherapy
for cancer treatment. Moreover, earlier popu-
lation exposure and acquired immunity also
determine the extent to which the immune
system is able to fight an infection. European
settlers brought to the Americas terrible
diseases, most notably smallpox, that ravaged
native populations but that they themselves
were largely immune to either because of
previous exposure, or because they had inher-
ited natural resistance evolved over time.
Since virulence is an outcome of the interac-
tion between pathogen and host, the level of
virulence of an infection may therefore differ
across circulating pathogen variants, host
species, populations and even individuals.
The virulence of a novel infection immedi-
ately after a host shift is therefore difficult to
predict. Classically, it was thought that the
initial maladaptation of host and pathogen to
each other resulted in highly virulent infections,
evolving towards mutualisms in the longer
term. While the latter has long since been
shown not to be the case, the belief that most
novel infections are initially more virulent is
largely due to an ascertainment bias towards
the most virulent outbreaks, while infections
causing little or no damage often go undetected.
......................................................
“Since virulence is an outcome
of the interaction between
pathogen and host, the level of
virulence of an infection may
therefore differ across circulat-
ing pathogen variants, host
species, populations and even
individuals.”
......................................................
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Figure 1. Different mechanisms of pathogen emergence in novel host species.
(A) The pathogen has “off the shelf” or pre-existing adaptations that have arisen in the original host species and allow direct infection and transmission within the
novel host. The distribution of pathogen variants in circulation in the novel host species will then depend on which variant(s) successfully jumped into the new host and on
the neutral mutations that have accumulated subsequently. (B) Although the pathogen harbours the necessary pre-existing adaptations for initial infection and
transmission within the novel host species, longer-term persistence requires the acquisition of mutation(s) that fine-tune the processes of infection and/or transmission in
the novel host environment. Thus, the pathogen variants found in the novel host species are those that exhibit such adaptive fine-tuning. (C) Following transmission
between original and novel host species, the pathogen is initially unable to persist within the novel host. Persistence will depend on the acquisition of adaptive mutations
that allow infection and transmission within the novel host. (D) Only one or a few variants of the pathogen have pre-existing adaptations to the novel host species. As a
result, inter-species transmission events only give rise to pathogen emergence in some cases, with pathogen variants in the novel host subsequently shaped by both
adaptive fine-tuning and neutral mutations. Adapted from Pepin et al (2010) with permission.
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Determining the level of virulence neces-
sary for novel pathogen emergence is chal-
lenging and requires comparison between
donor and recipient host species, a task
often limited by a lack of knowledge of the
donor species. Nonetheless, a comparative
study of human viruses suggested that
infections with lower virulence were more
likely to establish sustained transmission
among humans than more virulent ones
(Geoghegan & Holmes, 2018). In accor-
dance, the high virulence of the Nipah and
Ebola viruses—alongside strict public
health interventions—may partly explain
why their outbreaks exhibited only short
stuttering chains of transmission before
ultimately dying out of their own accord.
Further work is required to determine
whether pathogens that establish infections
of lower virulence in novel hosts are,
indeed, more likely to successfully adapt
than more virulent ones.
Whatever the level of virulence following
a host shift, we should expect to see dif-
ferences across host species, populations and
individuals, which are caused by a combina-
tion of environmental and genetic effects.
That related host species tend to show simi-
lar levels of virulence can help predict the
level of virulence in closely related species.
Such an approach has been employed, for
example, to identify the amphibian species
particularly at risk of extinction from the
devastating chytrid fungus, Batra-
chochytrium salamandrivorans.
Within a given host species, differences in
the ability to resist novel infections may stem
from disparities in access to food and, for
humans and livestock, in access to health care,
or from previous exposure to the pathogen. For
instance, during the 1918 H1N1 influenza
pandemic, some US cities were spared during
the first wave of infection. Those cities,
however, suffered higher mortality rates during
the second, more severe wave of infection,
presumably because people in previously
affected cities had acquired immunity a few
months earlier. Past pathogen exposures may
also shape the host population’s ability to resist
novel infections. The natural resistance of a
small proportion of Europeans to HIV has been
hypothesised to be a hand-down from the
Black Death in the Medieval Ages: selectively
beneficial mutations at that time would now
provide some level of cross-immunity to HIV.
While this is unlikely to be the case in this
particular instance, such cross-protection may,
nevertheless, explain why elderly people who
would have been exposed to pre-1950 influenza
strains were less affected than other age groups
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Figure 2. Illustration of a trade-off between exploitation and movement.
In order to replicate and transmit, pathogens need to exploit their host but in doing so, they can kill them and so reduce the time window to transmit to another host
individual. The figure shows an analogous problem faced by early island communities when environmental exploitation was required for dispersal to new islands, but
simultaneously reduced the time available to do so.
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by the 2009 swine H1N1 influenza outbreak.
Either way, any variation in host responses to
novel pathogens, combined with variation in
the level of virulence of the pathogen at
outbreak, is expected to have repercussions for
subsequent pathogen evolution.
Modelling virulence evolution
During the past decades, it has become clear
that evolutionary theory can provide a
powerful framework for understanding why
emerging pathogens harm their hosts and
how virulence may change over time (Ander-
son & May, 1982). Infection-induced symp-
toms and host mortality do not arise because
pathogens “want” to harm their hosts; rather,
harm occurs through two non-antagonistic
processes. First, pathogens exploit their hosts
to persist and replicate; in a similar way as
we degrade our environment when we use
its natural resources to subsist and repro-
duce. Second, symptoms are sometimes
necessary for pathogen transmission; sneez-
ing and coughing allow the transmission of
common cold and flu viruses to another host.
To use the analogy again, this is akin to
humans cutting down a forest for making
ships to disperse to new islands (Fig 2). The
harm caused to the host, however, means
that a pathogen must balance the advantage
of host exploitation for replication and/or
transmission, with the cost of killing the host
too quickly, and so reduce the window of
opportunity for transmission to another host
(Alizon et al, 2009). To continue with the
analogy, this would be equivalent to humans
exploiting their environment while having to
balance its rate of degradation with opportu-
nities for moving to other suitable habitats.
......................................................
“. . . evolutionary theory can
provide a powerful framework
for understanding why emerg-
ing pathogens harm their hosts
and how virulence may change
over time.”
......................................................
With this in mind, evolutionary theory can
be used to model optimal pathogen virulence
under a given set of conditions. Although we
have seen that a host population is unlikely
to be universally susceptible to a novel
pathogen, let us assume for simplicity that
most individuals are susceptible and have high
contact rates. Under this crude scenario,
pathogen variants with higher virulence
should have a selective advantage. It should
not matter how fast the pathogen kills its host,
because the large number of susceptible hosts
means that there is plenty of opportunities for
transmission, even if the infection is short.
Another reason is that, if the prevalence of
infection is high, it becomes more likely that
different pathogen variants emerge, which
compete with each other during co-infection.
Since natural selection should favour the vari-
ant that is able to transmit faster, thereby
outcompeting the others by killing the host
before others can transmit, virulence should,
under those conditions, increase. Whether the
virulence of an emerging pathogen actually
peaks following a host shift will depend on the
starting level of virulence, the cost of high
virulence and any barriers to transmission.
Barriers to transmission
A newly emerged pathogen can hit barriers to
transmission if there are less host individuals
to infect. This can happen when susceptible
individuals become rare, either because most
have died from infection leaving mainly natu-
rally resistant individuals, and/or because
those that have survived and recovered have
acquired immunity that prevents reinfection.
Barriers to transmission can also arise
through behaviour to minimise contamina-
tion, such as avoiding sick individuals. For
example, dead or diseased larvae and pupae
of the honeybee Apis mellifera are removed
to protect the nest from infection. Under such
conditions of reduced transmission opportuni-
ties, the balance should tip in favour of less
virulence to increase the window for what
has now become rarer transmission opportu-
nities. In terms of virulence optimum, this
means that the most evolutionarily successful
pathogens should do less harm, and thereby
have more time to transmit. In support, a
model of an H5N1 pandemic found that
public health strategies of physical distancing
could exert strong selection in favour of viral
variants of lower virulence that survived
longer within their hosts. Similarly, models of
the evolutionary impacts of different types of
vaccines have shown that vaccines that
prevent infection or block pathogen transmis-
sion will select for lower virulence (Gandon
et al, 2001). However, while blocking infec-
tion and transmission should lead to a reduc-
tion in virulence over time, strategies that
purge the pathogen after it has established an
infection are predicted to lead to the opposite
evolutionary outcome.
Clearing the pathogen should indeed select
for increased virulence because clearance
reduces the duration of infection, hence tipping
the balance in favour of faster transmission
before the pathogen is eliminated. The jump of
the bacterial pathogen Mycoplasma gallisep-
ticum from its original poultry host into a wild
North American songbird in 1994 caused an
epidemic so intense that naturally resistant indi-
viduals quickly increased in frequency over the
subsequent years (through increased survival
and/or reproduction). Such rapid spread of host
resistance, mediated by immune clearance,
was, in turn, found to have driven the rapid
evolution of higher pathogen virulence and
transmission rates (Tardy et al, 2019).
......................................................
“. . . while blocking infection
and transmission should lead
to a reduction in virulence over
time, strategies that purge the
pathogen [. . .] are predicted to
lead to the opposite evolution-
ary outcome.”
......................................................
While pathogen evolution in response to
host immunity can be challenging to detect in
wild populations, similar patterns of evolu-
tionary change can be observed, for example,
in response to our use of antibiotics. In a
mouse model, infections with the diarrhoeal
bacterial pathogen Salmonella typhimurium
can contain a mix of virulent inflammatory-
causing pathogen variants and avirulent
cheats that avoid the cost of triggering
inflammation. Antibiotic treatment was found
to favour the virulent variants over avirulent
ones, thus leading to increasing virulence and
transmissibility over time (Diard et al, 2014).
The consequences of increasing pathogen
virulence may not be problematic for hosts
that can deal with it through immunity or
medication. Complications, however, arise
when individuals differ in their abilities to
defend themselves: the evolution of more
virulent pathogens would be potentially catas-
trophic for hosts that are less resistant.
How easy it is for a pathogen to
adapt to a novel host?
Evolutionary theory can therefore be used to
model the fate of emerging pathogens under
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different conditions. But how easy is it for
an emerging pathogen to evolve adaptively
and how fast can it do so? The answer is that
it will depend on the likelihood and speed of
acquiring the necessary mutations (Wool-
house et al, 2005). References to “mutating
pathogens” in the science fiction literature
and tabloid media usually trigger panic.
However, mutation is simply a property of
the error-prone replication of pathogens, as
mismatches are introduced during the dupli-
cation of the genome. Because most muta-
tions will adversely affect the pathogen and
be quickly removed by natural selection,
pathogens replicating with a high mutation
rate, a small genome size—where mutation
will have large functional effects—and a
large population, should have the highest
adaptive potential. In support, RNA viruses,
which have all three of those traits, are more
likely to host shift than other types of patho-
gens. Bacteria, which typically have lower
mutation rates, large genome sizes and
lower census populations, may be more
limited in their ability to adapt to novel
hosts. It is worth noting that the few known
examples of bacterial host shifts involve
pathogens with unusually small genome
sizes and high mutation rates such as
Staphylococcus aureus or M. gallisepticum.
Either way, the likelihood that functionally
beneficial mutations arise will be greater the
more host individuals are infected.
......................................................
“When evolutionary concepts
are integrated into such
intervention strategies,
however, they can lead to
dramatic progress in the fight
against diseases.”
......................................................
But even when beneficial mutations do
arise, they will not necessarily lead to evolu-
tionary change. One reason is that transmis-
sion between host individuals can create
bottlenecks with only a few pathogen vari-
ants able to establish an infection. If these
bottlenecks are stochastic and randomly
remove some of the genetic diversity that
has arisen during an infection, then any new
beneficial mutation may be lost by chance
through genetic drift. For example, new HIV
infections are typically established by one or
very few viruses, even though the donors may
harbour a highly diverse viral population. In
addition, there may be host population-level
processes that accentuate stochasticity around
the transmission of any new mutation if, for
example, there are spatial heterogeneities or
seasonal variation in host densities.
Even if the beneficial mutation success-
fully transmits, the small size of the founding
pathogen population at the onset of infection
means that the growth of the different vari-
ants will also be subject to chance. Any
beneficial mutation risks, then again, to be
lost through genetic drift. Finally, a new
beneficial mutation can also be eliminated
by the host immune system, either because it
is cleared directly or because, by reducing
the pathogen population size, immune clear-
ance increases once more the chances that
the mutation will be lost through drift. There
are other effects that can slow down or even
hinder the spread of a beneficial mutation, and
while these effects may sometimes be overcome
by the selective gains conferred by that muta-
tion, it is clearly not so simple for a pathogen to
evolve adaptively to its novel host.
Conclusion
Although an evolutionary framework enables
us to make key projections regarding the fate
of novel infectious pathogens, including in
response to our control measures, evolutionary
biology is still too often overlooked in medical
and public health interventions (Nesse &
Stearns, 2008). When evolutionary concepts
are integrated into such intervention strategies,
however, they can lead to dramatic progress in
the fight against diseases. One of the best illus-
trations of the power of evolutionary theory is
our response to antibiotic resistance in bacte-
rial pathogens. As clinical antibiotics are
derived from microbial toxins that bacteria use
to fight each other, the evolution of resistance
is therefore simply a natural phenomenon that
we have unfortunately nurtured through exten-
sive use of antibiotics in health and agricul-
ture. The modelling and experimental testing
of evolutionary outcomes not only revealed
that methods of antibiotic administration intu-
itively believed to minimise such evolution
actually worsen it, but also helped to design
more effective alternatives of antibiotic usage.
A second example is the fight against malaria,
for which our ability to generate control
measures that will not erode over time—that
are “evolution proof”—is improved by an
understanding of the evolutionary ecology of
its mosquito-vector. Such measures may range
from using microsporidian parasites to
decrease larvae survival, adult biting rate and
longevity, to insecticides targeting old and/or
malaria-infected mosquitoes for which selec-
tion on resistance is likely to be weak. The
recent incorporation of evolutionary biology in
cancer research has also uncovered its value
for improving health beyond infectious
diseases. By providing a deeper understanding
of the behaviour and responses of infectious
pathogens, evolutionary biology thus repre-
sents a powerful approach for tackling human,
animal, plant and even ecosystem health.
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